This paper raises the questions: 'What do we expect from nursing ethics?' and 'Is the literature of nursing ethics any different from that of medical ethics?' It is suggested that rather than develop nursing ethics as a separate field writers in nursing ethics should take a lead in making the patient the centralfocus of health care ethics. The case is made for empirical work in health care ethics and it is suggested that a good way of setting about this is to ask practising nurses about the real ethical problems they encounter.
There is a lack of empirical work in the literature concerned with nursing ethics. It is my contention that this gap has left the way open for the development of a particular kind of writing, a rather prescriptive Olympian style of handed down ethics. This trend has led to a focus on particular philosophers and this in turn has helped to shape the area of applied ethics that has come to be known as nursing ethics. These issues are at the heart of the question: 'What should nursing ethics look like? ' Nursing ethics is a difficult area of study to apprehend, especially if it is to be considered as an entity in its own right, that is, in some way separate from medical ethics or bioethics. Nursing has a particular relationship with medicine within the organisational structure of health care and, indeed, in the hierarchy of occupations. In so far as any occupation can claim autonomous professional status and operate within a bureaucracy, medicine has managed to lay claim to and maintain professional status, in that it has control of its work and membership. Nursing work is dependent in part on medical practice and so the occupation can at best only lay claim to semi-professional status. This dependence on medicine means that nursing, when it wishes to develop itself, has a tendency to want to pull away and engage in uniquely nursing activities and debates.
I shall argue that nursing has a particular contribution to make to the ethics and health care debate, but that the contribution need not necessarily be the production of nursing ethics in contradistinction to It might be argued that the efforts that nursing is making in an attempt to achieve professional status could have something to do with the increasing interest in ethics. The production of nursing ethics texts could be seen as no more than a consequence of a growing number of academic departments of nursing. Whatever the aetiology, it remains the case that nurses are now plainly interested in the ethical dimension of health care. Nursing ethics exists as a phenomenon with a life of its own and it is unlikely to go away.
As a contributor (1) to the nursing ethics literature, for me to suggest that nursing ethics has no right to an independent existence or that the motivation for ethical debate within nursing is not all that it should be is perhaps disingenuous. However, the time has come when questions have to be asked about the nature and purpose of nursing ethics.
I have changed my perspective on nursing ethics over the last few years. After ten years of working in the field of bioethics, first on research projects involving a multidisciplinary research approach to bioethics and latterly writing about nursing ethics, I am still not altogether sure that we need a thing called 'nursing ethics', as opposed to a more generalised 'health care ethics' (2) . Why should we consider nursing ethics as an area of concern which is independent of medicine? Would an adequate notion of nursing ethics not simply be a reflection of medical ethics? The general argument that is put forward for the existence of nursing ethics is that the occasions giving rise to ethical concern are often the same for nursing as for medicine -abortion, euthanasia, care of the mentally ill, reproductive technology, intensive care, prolongation of life -but the difference for ethical debate lies in the way the issues present and the nature of the practical problems they bring.
The medical profession is often deemed to have the last word in ethical decisions, albeit in the guise of clinical judgement, because it is ultimately legally responsible for the patient's welfare. This is a fact that nurses sometimes refuse to accept, or so it would seem in some of the debates about the independent practice of nursing. If, however, we concern ourselves with the situation that currently prevails we have to conclude that the patient has a contract, both legal and moral with the doctor, not with the nurse. Some of the most notable cases where nurses have challenged doctors on moral grounds have been fundamentally flawed because nurses were making challenges from a weak position. This is true in the cases where student nurses, often with the backing of qualified staff, have refused to take part in electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) sessions or refused to administer drugs because they believed it was not in the best interests of the patients. It would seem to me that unless a psychiatrist is prescribing and administering ECT in a way that is not compatible with the code of practice of the College of Psychiatry, then the nurse has no grounds for complaint and non co-operation. Doctors' decisions of that nature are made on clinical grounds; psychiatrists' training makes them licensed practitioners with a mandate to make clinical decisions; this mandate is recognised by society. The nurses' training has a different end-goal. One might want to argue with this state of affairs, but as things currently stand it is quite clear that certain powers lie with doctors and little can be gained for patient care, or, for that matter, nursing ethics by individual nurses taking side-swipes at individual doctors exercising these powers. One only has to take a look at other areas of psychiatric care (3) to see that nurses have a lot to do to put their own house in order, before invading medical territory.
This rather military-style language draws attention to the fact that much of what we are dealing with in ethical debates in nursing and in health care generally is professional territoriality and power. Nursing's position in relation to medicine is, then, to a large extent determined by power. Issues of power and control essentially define the domain of the concerns of nurses and this includes ethical concerns. Doctors may take the decision to discontinue care -nurses have to put that decision into practice. Doctors, for instance, may admit a patient on a voluntary basis, it is the nurse that has to 'keep' the patient in the ward. Nursing ethics has, then, so the argument goes, a claim to an existence that is separate from and independent of, medical ethics. I know this argument well and have made it as a justification for writing about nursing ethics (4). However, before nursing ethics gets to be very much older, I think we should take a close look at this justification and the product that it allows, namely nursing ethics.
Lest this paper appears to be rather too damning, I should make it clear that I do think nurses must take ethics seriously and debate the issues -it is the nature of that enterprise and its rhetoric that I am questioning.
Who is responsible for what?
We must look behind the rhetoric if we are to determine just what it is that nursing ethics might be about -the task of nursing ethics. It seems to me that the nursing ethics literature is by and large no more than a mirror image of the medical or bioethics literature. It tends to discuss the same issues, dilemmas and philosophers. There may be a good reason for this. It could be that to sustain the notion of nursing ethics as a separate entity is easier said than done and so one would not expect to find much difference between the nursing and medical ethics texts. It is perhaps the interplay between the two perspectives on ethical issues -medicine's and nursing's -that has been neglected.
Much of the nursing contribution to ethical debates centres around the idea of doctors' values being hidden in clinical decisions and dressed up as 'professional judgement'. Because of the nature of the power distribution between medicine and nursing many ethical discussions come down to the nature of interdisciplinary work and to the question of who is responsible for what. We need to unpack and examine some of the value judgements and stands that are embedded in 'clinical judgements', which are largely the product of medicine. Nurses deal, for the most part, with the consequences of these decisions and judgements. It should not be forgotten, though, that nurses for their part have value judgements embedded in their own clinical practice and decisions. These, too, require examination.
A review of the literature reveals any number of introductions to ethics for nurses so that we can all become adept at recognising a utilitarian argument or a deontological approach to a situation, but there exists very little about what nurses in practice make of it all. This is very possibly because philosophers, unlike sociologists, do not tend to go on datagathering expeditions, instead they come by cases in a rather more particular way and reflect upon them. Jennings (5) 
Advocacy has adversarial connotations
Let us first look at advocacy. The main difficulty with this position is that advocacy has adversarial connotations. The advocacy route, then, is not necessarily a useful way for nursing to go. First, because there is no reason to suppose that nurses can be sufficiently removed from the organisation and the ideologies of health care and from nursing's own ideologies, to make and plead a patient's case as an advocate would have to do. It might also bring a nurse into conflict with his or her duty to care. Is the nurse going to plead the case for a patient if it is not in his best clinical interests? How do we balance the nurse's duty to care and the patient's right to selfdetermination? Also, to set the nurse up as the patient's advocate suggests that the rest of the health care professionals and the system are working against the patient's best interests: this might well be true, but nurses cannot claim to be neutral players in the game. Nurses have power, by virtue of their knowledge and familiarity with the system, whereas patients are, in general, vulnerable. So at best the activity of the nurse-as-advocate is likely to resemble benevolent paternalism on the part of the nurse and trusting acceptance on the part of the patient. Nurses may simply have to live with the moral uncertainty which accompanies their attempts to act in the best interests of the patient. It is precisely in these kinds of areas that we lack empirical work.
The ethics-of-caring literature is for the most part rather vague and possibly ill-founded. It deals in exhortations and rather idealistic notions of caring for individuals, leaving aside the institutional and organisational reality of most care. It also treats as unproblematic the fact that care is rather too general a notion for nursing to claim as its focus of professional activity. In other words caring can be widely defined and is something that lay people do frequently and well. It is therefore difficult to see how nursing could make a success out of constructing an ethics-of-caring literature that would further either nursing or caring.
So, if we are to cast doubt on advocacy and the ethics of caring, what direction should nursing ethics take? What might be the proper area of study for nursing ethics? The criticism that I have made of nursing ethics thus far has mainly to do with the fact that nursing appears to be more concerned with delineating what might be recognised as nursing ethics than with anything else. It then becomes all too easy to use nursing ethics as a cover for encroaching on doctors' territory and for criticising doctors (doctor-bashing). The patient tends to become part of the battleground, or at least an entity in the professional boundaries debates.
So what of the development of nursing ethics?
Professional aspirations can shape a discipline and its activities as much as anything else. We can, I think, include the philosophers in the professional territory arguments. It is perhaps not without significance that as the cuts in university finances hit the arts faculties, moral philosophers are looking for areas in which to apply their discipline. Teaching of medical ethics or health care ethics provides one outlet and the role of the hospital ethicist another. The idea of having an ethicist in the hospital is gaining acceptance in the US and is talked about in, but has not yet taken off in, the UK. It will be interesting to see how long the hospital ethicist can stay on the outside of the inter-professional wrangling that teamwork involves. There could come a day when the doctors are toppled from their position of dominance and replaced by the ethicist or philosopher. Whether ethicists should be drawn from the ranks of the health care professions or from departments of philosophy is a point for debate.
There is possibly a parallel between the partnership that Jennings (5) suggests would benefit both social science and bioethics, and a partnership which might benefit nursing ethics and nurse theorists working on the concept of nursing care.
If nursing ethics is to develop usefully, one route it might take would be to focus upon the patient rather than to concentrate on professional codes and aspirations. The Caring is clearly an all-important part of nursing and other health care professionals' work, yet if we focus solely on this there is a danger of leaving the patient's experience out of the equation. As the patient-experience and the practice of caring are closely bound together it would make good sense to give due emphasis to both.
An ethnographic approach to the study of patients' experiences of different diseases and traumas that give rise to ethical dilemmas would add to our knowledge. Sociologists have much to offer in this area. It would help also if we could obtain rather more of an idea of what nurses in practice regard as the morally problematic areas of their work. We should ask questions such as: 'Do moral philosophical debates have relevance for practice?' and 'What are the concerns of those working in the areas of patient care?' rather than simply taking the works of Kant, Mill and Rawls (these are typically the authors that the philosophers have seen fit to present bioethical discussions through) and then trying to make judgements about nursing practice through the particular approaches of those philosophers. Starting with the practice rather than the philosophy might lead us to other texts.
I am currently working on a research project which has as its focus staff nurses' accounts of the moral aspects of their work. It involves an ethnographic approach with informal interviews, the aim being to discover what those who work in the patient-care areas think about the moral dimension of their practice and of the current ethical debates. In addition to the interview data there are field-notes from participant observation in intensive care units. This observation was included so that the study would include data from the areas which are so often discussed in abstract terms in ethics texts.
If 
